Philosophical and theological analysis of the lie from the speech act theory

Authors

  • Vicente Vide Rodríguez Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, España

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21501/23461780.2011

Keywords:

Truth, Speech act, Communicative action, Irony

Abstract

In the current philosophical scene we have different semantic theories of
truth. Moreover, the majority of perpetrators of moral theology closely follow
the thought of San Agustin and Santo Tomas de Aquino, by defining the lie as a
language that is contrary to their own thinking with the intention to deceive. It
must be integrated in the philosophical and theological analysis of the lie theory of
speech acts (Austin, Searle and Habermas, among others), since lying is not just
its phrase dimension. It presents, in addition, a phrase force and communicative
intent, since it can reinterpret the classical principles of the amphibole or mental
constraint, answers with double meaning, the lesser of two evils or the white
lies.
Thus, the philosophical and theological notion of lie must take into account the
analysis from the human sciences and, especially, the linguistic sciences. In
addition, remember that it is not always possible nor desirable for humans to
express a perfect match between what the individual says that it is true, what
they believed to be true, and what the reality is. That is why, in addition to the
phrase dimension, it is necessary to incorporate into the analysis of the speech
act of lying the dimensions of coherence, authenticity, loyalty, honesty and
transparency, assuming at the same time the opacity, the paradoxes of life, and
the irony of human existence.

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Author Biography

Vicente Vide Rodríguez, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, España

Doctor en Teología por la Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, España.

References

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Published

2016-07-01

How to Cite

Vide Rodríguez, V. (2016). Philosophical and theological analysis of the lie from the speech act theory. Perseitas, 4(2), 153–175. https://doi.org/10.21501/23461780.2011

Issue

Section

Artículos de investigación científica y tecnológica