The Will, a link between the supreme good and the inclinations

Abstract

In this article, the Kantian concept of Will is investigated, in order to answer the question: how is the supreme good and the inclinations objectively related? For this purpose, it starts from the conceptual conceptions of morality in Kant argued in his works, more precisely from his second Critique. According to Kant, the Will is the desire to obey the laws of reason, that is, the moral laws, without any interference from sensory pathologies. In order to try to find the objective possibility between reason and inclination, I maintain, based on second readings of interpreters of Kant, such as Schnewind, for example, the optimistic position in which man is in full desiderative faculty to subsume his actions to the judgments of reason. The title of this article allows us to visualize how the Will serves as a link between the principles of reason and the empirical objectivity of actions. The concept of Will in
Kant makes it possible to clarify the rational capacities with which human nature has been endowed, which would be as much as to say that, yes, it is possible, once one has critically reflected on the formal structure of morality in Kant, get to obtain acts in the fundamental empirical plane from the reason and not from the pathological inclination.