Institutional aspects with an influence over changes in management accounting

Authors

  • José Joaquín Alzate Marín Universidad de Los Andes, Mérida-Venezuela

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21501/2500-669X.1916

Keywords:

Information economics, Institutional Theory, the role of business, management accounting, information asymmetries.

Abstract

This paper is expected to show that information economy represents a critical change in business management. Adam Smith’s thesis stating that markets are self-regulated has lost validity. Markets with high or low State interference allow us to distrust its results. The role information plays in decision-making has become major today; there are information asymmetries between those who govern and those who are governed. In a similar fashion, those who compete in the market need to overcome information asymmetries and, in turn, find ways to overcome the unfortunate consequences of such asymmetries.
In addition, information is more complex nowadays, the markets are more volatile, and quantity and quality of information are needed, if the control of daily company operations is sought after.

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Author Biography

José Joaquín Alzate Marín, Universidad de Los Andes, Mérida-Venezuela

Mérida-Venezuela

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Published

2016-04-15

How to Cite

Alzate Marín, J. J. (2016). Institutional aspects with an influence over changes in management accounting. Science of Human Action, 1(1), 87–102. https://doi.org/10.21501/2500-669X.1916

Issue

Vol. 1 No. 1 (2016)

Section

Contabilidad

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